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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
V Viiblished by the Umiergraduates of the
Vol. Vu Wanhiu'gton Univer,i-v 4%chool of Law No. 4
THE CASE OF WAR PRISONERS.
A\e complain of unrest, and we have been quick to denounce
the authors of dissatisfaction; but have we taken the pains
to ascertain just what the cause of this attitude may be!
Inquiry woulh no doubt show that the pere ntage of wilful
wrongdoers is very small, and that they are therefore not to
be regarded as a serious menace to our institutions. The
danger lies rather with people who arc not wilfully wrong,
but who are disturbed by their inability to understand or to
justify the course of the Government. That such a state of
mind exists is natural. We have just emerged from a war
during which absolutism reigned; and we find it difficult to
work back to a state of peace. There are those who are
reluctant to lay down the arbitrary authority; and there are
others who submitted readily enough to that power but who
now react and demand, not only a restoration to pre-war
rule, but a correction of hardships or wrongs that were
imposed during the struggle.
It will hardly be disputed, for illustration, that prosecu-
tions during the war were affected by prevailing excitement.
It goes without saying that every stage of the proceedings
hrom the grand jury room to the final judgment of the court
was subjected to such influence.
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The report made some time ago by such men as Dean Roscoe
Pound, Professors Zachariah Chaffee, Felix Frankfurter,
Tyrrell Williams and eight other well-known members of the
bar, and the hearings had in the Senate and in the House upon
that report and in support of the resolution for general
aniesty of war prisoners, establish beyond reasonable ques-
tion, two things: First, that the conduct of the Department
of Justice has frequently disregarded iundamental rules of
constitution and law. Second, that court proceedings havc
very often been characterized by high-handed methods; by
disregard of essential right; and by sentences which defy
every standard that would be accepted in normal times.
It may be conceded that during a war the Government must
resort to severe measures. There is no time for refinements.
It is necessary not only to control those who threaten mis-
c.hief, but it is also proper to deter others who may harbor
similar plans. In other words, the rule of necessity prevails.
But for that very reason every effort should now be made
to correct unnecessary hardship, and to restore normal rules.
As in war time, every doubt is resolved in favor of securitv.:
so now every reasonable doubt should be welcomed for the
,xercise of magnanimity.
In Great Britain sentences in cases of war offenses were
so moderate that they expired virtually with the war, and
presented no occasion for the exercise of amnesty. British
justice may therefore claim the proud distinction that the
spirit of equity and even mercy restrained and guided these
proceedings from the inception.
It is reported that other countries adopted a similar policy.
In France the complaint is mow openly made that even
enemy prisoners are being subjected to umnecessary and
unjust sentences. In our country only a few offenders have
been pardoned, and, so far as the public can judge, these
pardons were prompted by consideration for individual
offenders, and do not suggest a basis for a general policy.
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The first appeals for pardons were of course made by
members of the prisoners' families. Their fate ts serious and
even tragic,---calculated to arouse profoundest sympathy; and
justified by only the gravest necessity. Friends of these
prisoners likewise interceded. They were no doubt associates
who are unable to reconcile the fate of their comrades with
the accustomed standards of justice.
Finally, facts and arguments were advanced by men and
women who were not moved by personal consideration, but
who speak in the name of traditional justice. They have
apparently made careful inquiry. They have expressed defi-
nite opinions. Their conclusions are entitled to serious
attention, because they present an issue of gravest conse-
quence. Infinitely more than the fate of so many unfortunate
men, women and children, is involved. Our whole administra-
tion of justice has been challenged.
The administration of our law is based largely upon tradi-
tion and precedent. If it be true that sen.ences imposed
during the war rest upon over-zealous prosecution, upon fear
or partiality induced by abnormal excitement, upon hasty or
timid conclusion by juries, or upon undue manifestations of
Vatriotisin in the imposition of sentences, then it is of first
importance to the general public, as well as the prisoners,
that these -iequalities be corrected.
There is abundant authority for such inquiry by the execu-
tive branch of the Government. For illustration, in 1912
there was brought to the attention of the Department of
Justice and the President of the United States, the case of
Willard N. Jones, who had been indicted and convicted in
two cases for defrauding the United States of public lands.
The sentence had been affirmed upon appeal; but the defend-
ant had not served any part of his term. It was made to
appear to the satisfaction of the authorities that the defend-
and did not have a fair and impartial trial, because of "the
improper manner in which the jury box was filled from which
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the jury was drawn, and the probability that witnesses had
been intimidated." Upon this ground alone the Attorney
General recommended a pardon, and the President granted
it. This action seemed drastic. There was, no suggestion
that the defendant was innocent. It was not proved that the
jury had been intimidated. The pardon was really based
upon the one ground that the jury box was unfairly filled.
Upon that ground alone a man confessedly guilty of a grave
fraud upon the Government was pardoned to vindicate the
administration of law.
This rule was good then and should be good now. There
are war prisoners in the penitentiary whose offenses as
charged were trifling, compared to the one for which Willard
N. Jones was convicted. There are men in the penitentiary
in whose cases the evidence was so technical and so inade-
quate that under normal conditions it is doubtful whether
any judge would have permitted their cases to go to the
jury. Practically all the war prisoners are men whose sole
offense consisted in careless or dangerous speech, but the
sentences run up to twenty years or more. There is one min
who enjoys the best possible reputation as a workman, but
who serves a term of ten years, and has been fined $30,000
upon the showing that he was affiliated with the I. W. W.,
and that he had written for a publication which had not even
been denounced by the Government. This in spite of the fact
that he and his whole organization were pro-ally. The enor-
mity of his case is not exceptional. But apart from the
precise showing of technical records, the important fact is
that these men were tried under *conditions of abnormal excite-
ment; and that they should now have the benefit of dispas-
sionate and fair consideration.
The demand has been made for a general amnesty of all
prisoners. This was refused by the Department for the good
reason that pardons should be granted with discrimination.
They should not go merely to express the magnanimity of the
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Chief Executive, but they should be tested by the merits of
each individual case. For such an inquiry the Department
of Justice, considering all its other burdens, may not be ade-
quately equipped. But assuming this to be true, what is
there to prevent members of the bar from performing this
work? A mere reading of the reports that have been made,
and of the statements submitted to the Senate and House
Conunittees by individual members of the bar, can leave no
doubt that the general public, and certainly all lawyers, are
put upon the inquiry. The obligation would appear to be
clear. It is said that during the war lawyers in some parts
of the country refused, and even agreed among themselves,
to d,.cline to represent any person charged with an offense
mnder the espionage law. It serves no purpose at this time
to discuss such an attitude, however difficult it may be to
i tconcile it with the oath that every lawyer has to take. But
the halting attitude of lawyers during the war does serve
to put upon them now the double obligation to lend their aid
to vindicate the administration of justice, to redeem our
pledges of liberty, and to relieve unfortunate victims of the
harsh policy of war necessity. No court is in a position to
impose a just sentence unless and until the accused has had
a full and fair hearing. The very condition to a severe
sentence is a judicial inquiry into the facts. That it was
not possible for one reason or another to have such hearifigs
in a large percentage of war cases goes without saying. Every
impartial observer knows that conviction was in the air, and
that the spirit of intolerance and denunciation invaded every
sphere of life. It should have been accepted as the first duty,
particularly of lawyers of position, to go to the defense of any
one accused, in times of unnatural disturbance. So is it the
duty of the law fraternity now to insist, either at the call of
the Department, or by independent action, upon an investiga-
tion, in order that actual facts may be established. The
entire proceedings should be uncovered. The public mind
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should be satisfied that the sentences imposed were just then
and are just now, or that they are unjust. In the latter event
it should be urged in the interest of the public and of the
accused that those sentences be modified or abated by execu-
tive action. More is involved than the granting or with-
holding of executive clemency. What is needed is public
understanding and approval. Nothing would so potently
serve to set the controversy at rest, to relieve the war prison-
ers, or to disarm constantly growing criticism of their deten-
tion, than a clear recommendation by a competent disinter-
ested body of lawyers.
We trace most of our system of law to England. We have
derived from England much of the inspiration that has
guided us in the administration of that law. There is danger
that we neglect the real teachings of that system and that
spirit. If there be those who would complacently satisfy
their conscience with the belief that these cases are only of
private concern, and should be left in the hands of such assist-
ance as these victims could at the time command, they would
do well to go back to the original source and inspiration of
our law. All such evasions of responsibility are met by a
single statement made by Lord Erskine, the greatest aavo-
cate, as well as the first forensic orator, who ever appeared
in any age. In his defense of Thomas Paine, he, too, was
pursued by calumnious clamor; but he did not yield, for this
was his answer:
"Little indeed did they know me, who thought that such
calumnies would influence my conduct. I will forever, at all
hazards, assert the dignity, independence, and integrity of
the English bar, without which, impartial justice, the most
valuable part of the English constitution, can have no
existence. From the moment that any advocate can be per-
mitted to say that he will or will not stand between the crown
and the subject arraigned in the court where he daily sits to
practice, from that moment the liberties of England are at
198
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an end. If the advocate refuses to defend, from what he may
think of the charge or of the defense, he assumes the charac-
ter of the judge; nay, he assumes it before the hour of judg-
ment; and in proportion to his rank and reputation, puts the
heavy influence of perhaps a mistaken opinion into the scale
against the accused, in whose favor the benevolent principle
of English law makes all presumptions, and which commands
the very judge to be his counseL"
It is not necessary to comment upon this language. Its
truth is self-evident.
Fortunately we may look to great men in our own country
for similar conduct. Alexander Hamilton met intolerance and
demagogism with the same courage and determination when
he defended the rights of loyalists under our treaty with
England at the close of the Revolutionary War.
Who will say that the men who serve war sentences would
now be confined if their defense had been addressed to a
public opinion awake to the spirit of Erskine and Hamilton?
And if that be true, how can lawyers hesitate to move for
the correction of injustice to the victims, and for the vindica-
tion of the administration ol law?
Unless our law be administered in that spirit, no constitu-
tion, with all its solemn guaranties, no proud utterances about
the blessings of our country, and no boast of freedom, in
declaration of platform, can save us from well deserved loss
of our treasured liberty.
CHARLES NAGEL.
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